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Abstract
The implications of local currency pricing (LCP) for monetary regime choice are
analysed for a country facing foreign monetary shocks. In this analysis expendi-
ture switching is potentially welfare reducing. This contrasts with the existing LCP
literature, which focuses on productivity shocks and thus analyses a world where
expenditure switching is welfare enhancing. This paper shows that, when home and
foreign producers follow LCP, expenditure switching is absent and a oating rate is
preferred by the home country. But when only home producers follow LCP, expen-
diture switching is present and a xed rate can be welfare enhancing for the home
country.
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1 Introduction
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that producers engaged in international trade often
set prices in the currency of buyers, i.e. they engage in local currency pricing (LCP).1 This
has prompted a lively literature examining optimal exchange rate and monetary policy
in the context of LCP. This literature has, almost without exception, focused on models
where the underlying source of uncertainty is shocks to productivity (or labour supply).
This implies that exchange rate movements have a potentially benecial role in directing
consumer demand towards the country experiencing a positive productivity shock and
away from the country experiencing low productivity. The expenditure switching role of
exchange rates is therefore potentially welfare enhancing. The main point of debate in this
literature is whether LCP, by breaking the short-term link between the nominal exchange
rate and the prices faced by buyers, undermines the expenditure switching role of exchange
rate movements and thus removes one of the benets of exchange rate exibility. Devereux
and Engel (2003) in particular argue that, in the LCP case (where the exchange rate has
no expenditure switching role), a xed exchange rate is benecial because it enhances
consumption risk sharing.2
An alternative view of the exchange rate policy problem is that monetary or nancial
market shocks are an important source of movements in exchange rates. Such exchange
rate movements, far from reallocating demand optimally, will in fact be the cause of misal-
locations of demand. In other words, in this view, the exchange rate is a shock transmitter
rather than a shock absorber. The expenditure switching e¤ect in this case is a source
1See, for instance, Engel (1999), Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for
broad discussion of empirical evidence on LCP. Recent important contributions to the empirical literature
on LCP are Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), Goldberg and Campa (2010), Gopinath et al (2010) and
Gopinath et al (2011).
2Devereux and Engel (2003) show that in the presence of LCP, exchange rate movements cause changes
in the real exchange rate which undermine e¢ cient consumption risk sharing. It is therefore optimal
to stabilise the nominal exchange rate. There has been a number of counter-arguments to this point of
view. For instance, Obstfeld (2002) shows that LCP in trade in nal goods does not prevent expenditure
switching as long as there is producer currency pricing (PCP) at the intermediate goods level, so a oating
exchange rate is still better than a xed rate. Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) show that even in the presence
of LCP, exchange rate exibility is necessary for optimal risk sharing even when there are non-traded
consumption goods. In a more general model, Devereux and Engel (2007) show that optimal exchange
rate exibility depends on the trade-o¤ between expenditure switching and risk sharing. Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005), Engel (2011) and Sutherland (2005) present further analyses of optimal monetary policy
in LCP models. Engel (2009) and Sutherland (2005) show that exchange rate variability is a potentially
important factor in optimal monetary policy in certain circumstances. See Corsetti et al (2010) and Engel
(2014) for recent surveys of the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies.
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of sub-optimal volatility in output and consumption. The idea that exchange rates are
often substantially misaligned relative to real fundamentals is indeed a staple of the policy
debate. The wide uctuations in the value of the major currencies in the post Bretton
Woods period have given rise to frequent calls for intervention to stabilise exchange rates.
It is clear that there is a widespread view that uctuations in nominal exchange rates of
the magnitude of +/-50% in the space of a few years (as has been the case for the US
dollar) are unlikely to be driven exclusively by optimal responses to relative productivity
movements.
Clearly, by a¤ecting the link between the nominal exchange rate and relative prices,
LCP may have important implications for the way in which monetary and nancial market
shocks generate expenditure switching. This in turn may have a signicant impact on
the welfare performance of alternative exchange rate and monetary policy regimes. By
focusing on productivity shocks, the current literature on LCP has largely overlooked this
connection between monetary shocks, LCP and exchange rate regime choice. In this paper
we aim to address this potentially important shortcoming of the current literature. We
analyse the implications of LCP for monetary policy in an economy which faces exchange
rate volatility arising from monetary shocks in a foreign country. The analysis focuses
on optimal monetary policy for the home country in the face of these foreign monetary
shocks. In our analysis, expenditure switching is potentially welfare reducing. This is in
direct contrast to the Devereux and Engel (2003) analysis, which analyses the impact of
LCP on regime choice in a world where expenditure switching may be welfare enhancing.
We analyse four possible combinations of producer currency pricing (or PCP, where
producers set prices in their own currency) and LCP in a two-country model. There are
two symmetric cases. One with both home and foreign producers following PCP (Case
1, in our analysis below). And one with both home and foreign producers following LCP
(Case 2). There are also two asymmetric cases. One with home producers following PCP
and foreign producers following LCP (Case 3). And one with home producers following
LCP and foreign producers following PCP (Case 4).
In Case 1, where producers in both countries follow PCP, we show that the exchange
rate volatility caused by foreign monetary shocks causes sub-optimal volatility in home-
country output.3 This creates an incentive for the home country to dampen movements
in the exchange rate. However, in Case 2, where there is complete and symmetric LCP,
we nd that the expenditure switching e¤ect is absent. This implies that exchange rate
movements play no part in transmitting foreign monetary shocks to the home country. The
incentive to stabilise the exchange rate is correspondingly reduced. In this case, oating
3A detailed analysis of this case is presented in Senay and Sutherland (2007a).
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rate regimes are shown to be welfare superior to a xed exchange rate. Notice that the
presence of LCP in this case has an e¤ect which is exactly opposite to that in the Devereux
and Engel (2003) analysis, where LCP creates an incentive for exchange rate stabilisation.
These results are based on a case where producers in both countries follow local currency
pricing.4 The conclusions are somewhat di¤erent, however, if LCP is asymmetric. In Case
3, where home country producers adopt PCP while foreign producers adopt LCP, we nd
that the case for exchange rate exibility is strengthened relative to the symmetric PCP
case. But in the opposite case (Case 4), where home producers follow LCP and foreign
producers follow PCP, the case for exchange rate stabilisation is strengthened. In fact, in
this second asymmetric case, it is shown that a xed rate can out-perform oating rate
regimes in welfare terms.
It is shown therefore that LCP, when it arises in the particular asymmetric way rep-
resented by Case 4, can strengthen the argument for a xed exchange rate. But the
underlying reasons di¤er from those emphasised by Devereux and Engel (2003). It is the
continued presence of expenditure switching in our Case 4 which is important, while in
Devereux and Engel (2003) it is the absence of expenditure switching which creates the
argument for exchange rate stabilisation.
The two asymmetric cases are particularly interesting because, for many countries, it is
natural for both exports and imports to be priced in a reference currency, such as the US
dollar. For instance, Tavlas (1997), Bekx (1998), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Gopinath
and Rigobon (2008), Goldberg and Campa (2010) and Gopinath et al (2010) provide
extensive evidence on the use of the US dollar as the currency most used for price setting in
international trade. Case 4 corresponds to a world where the foreign currency is a reference
currency (e.g. the US dollar). So the policy problem analysed can be interpreted as the
choice faced by countries (other than the USA) in a world where trade is priced in US
dollars and where US monetary shocks cause uctuations in the value of the dollar. The
conclusion is that such countries can benet by stabilising (or even xing) the value of
their home currency against the dollar. This indeed corresponds to the monetary policy
actually adopted by a wide range of emerging market countries. The rst asymmetric case
(Case 3) corresponds to a world where the home currency is a reference currency, while
monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. The unsurprising conclusion,
in this case, is that exchange rate exibility is a useful way for the home country to insulate
4Our result for the symmetric LCP case closely resembles one of the cases considered by Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2000). Unlike much of the literature on monetary policy and LCP, Bacchetta and
van Wincoop consider monetary shocks and in a potentially asymmetric policy analysis. They show that
an asymmetric peg is inferior to a oating exchange rate. But, unlike this paper, they do not analyse
asymmetric LCP.
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itself from foreign monetary shocks.5
Devereux et al (2007) analyse optimal monetary policy in a world with a reference
currency (i.e. a world with asymmetric LCP/PCP). They nd that the reference currency
country is indi¤erent to exchange rate volatility while non-reference currency countries
place a high weight on exchange rate volatility in welfare. They focus on a Nash equilibrium
in monetary policy setting and show that the reference currency country su¤ers a welfare
loss from the reference status of its currency. Goldberg and Tille (2009) also analyse
monetary policy in a world with a reference currency. As with much of the other literature
on LCP, and in contrast to the analysis presented in this paper, these authors focus on
optimal monetary policy in the face of productivity shocks.
The model we use is very standard. The main di¤erence compared to others is the
focus on monetary shocks. In itself, as a general proposition, it is not surprising that policy
prescriptions change when the source of shocks changes. This is a well-known theoretical
result. Our contribution is to analyse in detail how this works out in a standard model
which has been widely used in the current literature. The simplicity of the model allows
us to identify the specic transmission mechanisms of monetary shocks and show and
describe intuitively how optimal policy depends on these mechanisms and the currency of
price setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the model, Section 3
describes and discusses the links between monetary policy and welfare, Section 4 presents
the main discussion of alternative monetary policy regimes in the four cases outlined above,
and Section 5 concludes.
5A further interesting question is prompted by our analysis. If rms could freely choose the currency
in which to price goods, would the equilibrium display LCP in the home country and PCP in the foreign
county, or vice versa? Gopinath et al (2010) provide evidence that endogenous choice of pricing currency
is indeed a feature of the data. Our paper does not consider endogenous choice of invoicing currency, but
Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) o¤er some useful indicators of the likely e¤ect. They show that the
currency with the lowest variance of monetary shocks is likely to be chosen as the reference currency. In
other words, in the model of the current paper, the home currency will be chosen as the reference currency.
And thus exchange rate exibility will be benecial to the home country. However, there are other factors,
not modelled by Devereux, Engel and Storgaard, which a¤ect the choice of reference currency. The US
dollar is clearly a major reference currency because of the size of the US economy and the liquidity and
e¢ ciency of US monetary and nancial markets, and not because of the low variance of monetary shocks
in the USA. The size and liquidity of the US monetary sector is thus likely to outweigh other factors in
the choice of reference currency for small emerging market countries. Therefore, the case where home
producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP (our Case 4), with monetary shocks occurring in
the foreign country, is likely to be relevant for many emerging market economies, despite the Devereux,
Engel and Storgaard (2004) prediction.
4
2 The Model
We use a variant of the benchmark sticky-price general equilibrium model that follows the
framework developed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 2002). The analysis focuses on the
impact of foreign monetary shocks, which are the only source of stochastic shocks in the
model. Four possible regimes for the home monetary authority considered.
The world consists of two equal-sized countries, the home country and the foreign
country, and exists for only one period. Each country is populated by a unit mass of
agents, with home agents indexed h 2 [0; 1] and foreign agents indexed f 2 [0; 1]. The
consumption basket is identical for all home and foreign agents and consists of all home
and foreign produced goods. Each agent is a monopoly producer of a single di¤erentiated
product. All agents set prices before shocks occur and are contracted to meet demand at
these pre-set prices. We consider both producer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency
pricing (LCP).
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign country
has an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and foreign currency
prices are indicated with an asterisk.
2.1 Preferences
The utility of representative home agent h is
U (h) = E

logC (h) +  log
M (h)
P
  K
2

y2H (h) + y
2
H (h)

(1)
where  and K are positive constants, C is a consumption index dened across all home
and foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer
price index, yH (h) is the output of good h for sale in the home country and yH (h) is the
output of good h for sale in the foreign country and E is the expectations operator.6
The consumption index C for home agents is
C =
"
1
2
 1

C
 1

H +

1
2
 1

C
 1

F
# 
 1
(2)
where CH and CF are Dixit-Stiglitz indices of home and foreign produced goods with
elasticity between individual goods denoted ; where  > 1. The parameter  is the
6Utility is assumed to be additively separable in yH (h) and yH (h). This greatly simplies the algebra
and provides a very simple and intuitive set of results. An alternative model, with non-additively sepa-
rable utility in yH (h) and yH (h) ; delivers qualitatively the same conclusions but at the cost of greater
complexity.
5
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. In many papers in the related
literature, this parameter is assumed to be unity. It will become apparent below that 
plays an key role in determining the strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect and thus
has important implications for the welfare ranking of monetary policy regimes.
The budget constraint of agent h is
M(h) = M0 + pH (h) yH(h) + Sp

H (h) y

H(h)  PC(h)  T + PR(h) (3)
where M0 and M(h) are initial and nal money holdings, T is a lump-sum government
transfer, pH (h) is the price of home good h for sale in the home market, pH (h) is the
foreign currency price of home good h for sale in the foreign market, S is the nominal
exchange rate (expressed as the home currency price of foreign currency) and R(h) is the
income from a portfolio of state contingent assets (to be described in more detail below in
sub-section 2.3).
The governments budget constraint is: M M0+T = 0: Changes in the money supply
are assumed to enter and leave the economy via changes in lump-sum transfers.
The aggregate consumer price index for home agents is
P =

1
2
P 1 H +
1
2
P 1 F
 1
1 
(4)
where PH and PF are the price indices for home and foreign goods respectively.
Given the utility function and budget constraint just described, optimal home demands
for home and foreign goods are
CH =
1
2
C

PH
P
 
; CF =
1
2
C

PF
P
 
(5)
The demand for home and foreign goods by foreign agents has an identical structure to
the home demands. The total population of each country is normalised to unity. The total
demands for goods are therefore equivalent to individual demands.
The aggregate output of home goods for sale in the home and foreign countries are
respectively YH and Y H and the corresponding outputs for the foreign country are YF and
Y F : In equilibrium it follows that YH = CH ; YF = CF ; Y

H = C

H and Y

F = C

F where C

H
and CF are foreign country demands for home and foreign goods.
2.2 Price Setting
Agents set the prices of their output in advance of the realisation of shocks. The rst-order
conditions for price setting di¤er depending on whether producers engage in PCP or LCP.7
7We assume home and foreign goods markets are segmented (in the sense that separate prices can be set
in home and foreign markets for all goods) in both PCP and LCP cases. Notice that the law of one price,
6
When home producers follow PCP (i.e. set prices in their own currency), the rst-order
condition for price setting imply
PH =

  1
KE [Y 2H ]
E [YH=(PC)]
; P H =

  1
KE [Y 2H ]
E [Y H=(PC)]S
(6)
where PH is the price of home goods for sale to home agents and P H is the price of home
goods for sale to foreign agents (expressed in foreign currency). These expressions indicate
that a form of risk premium arises in goods prices because agents face uncertainty over the
level of work e¤ort.
When home producers engage in LCP the rst-order conditions for home and foreign
prices are as follows
PH =

  1
KE [Y 2H ]
E [YH=(PC)]
; P H =

  1
KE [Y 2H ]
E [SY H=(PC)]
(7)
Note that the only di¤erence between (7) and (6) is the way the exchange rate enters in the
expression for P H : In the PCP case, producers set the price of the home good in the foreign
market in terms of home currency. The nominal exchange rate a¤ects the foreign currency
price, P H ; after the monetary shock is realised, so prices exhibit full exchange rate pass-
through. In the LCP case home producers set the price of the home good in the foreign
market in foreign currency before the monetary shock is realised and the exchange rate is
determined. It is thus only expectations of the exchange rate which enter the expression
for P H in (7). The actual realisation of the exchange rate has no impact on P

H ; so there
is no exchange rate pass-through.
Similar expressions can be derived for the prices of foreign goods, PF and P F in the
PCP and LCP cases.
One of the monetary policy rules considered below is a regime which targets a measure
of producer prices for the home economy. We dene this producer price measure to be
the price of home goods for sale in the home country, PH : Because, in this model, all
goods prices are pre-set (and thus do not vary in response to shocks), the price-targeting
regime is modelled in terms of the price level that producers would choose in a exible
price environment. This price level, denoted P VH (where the superscript V indicates that
this is a virtualor notionalprice level) is given by the expression for PH in (6) (or (7))
after removing the expectations operators from the right hand side, i.e.
P VH =

(  1)KYHPC (8)
and thus purchasing power parity, does not hold even in the PCP case. Assuming non-segmented markets
in the PCP case (so that the law of one price does hold in that case) makes no signicant di¤erence to the
results reported below.
7
Price targeting is dened in terms of a target level for P VH :
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2.3 Financial Markets and Risk Sharing
When, as in the current model, shocks are asymmetric and the focus of interest is the
policy choice and welfare of a single country, it is necessary explicitly to consider how
policy choices a¤ect asset prices and portfolio decisions. We assume that nancial markets
are su¢ ciently sophisticated to allow full sharing of consumption risks. This is achieved
by assuming that trade takes place in equity shares in each countrys real income. Thus a
unit of the home equitypays a return proportional to y where
y = (YHPH=S + Y

HP

H)=P

and a unit of the foreign equitypays a return proportional to y where
y = (YFPF=S + Y FP

F )=P

The portfolio returns for home and foreign agents are thus
R (h) = H (h) (y   qH)Q+ F (h) (y   qF )Q (9)
R (f) = H (f) (y   qH) + F (f) (y   qF ) (10)
where H (h) and F (h) are holdings of home agent h of the home and foreign equities,
H (f) and 

F (f) are the holdings of foreign agent f of home and foreign equities, qH and
qF are the unit prices of the home and foreign equities and Q = P S=P is the real exchange
rate.
It is important to note that (following Devereux and Engel, 2003), the payo¤s from
assets are assumed to be transferred between countries in terms of money. Transfers in
terms of goods are ruled out. This implies that the equilibrium in asset markets does not
ensure fully e¢ cient risk sharing in the case of LCP. This is because households in the
two countries value the portfolio payo¤s in terms of the goods prices they face in their
respective countries. In the LCP case, the law of one price does not hold so there will be
distortions in relative valuations of the portfolio payo¤ across the two countries.
Asset trade is assumed to take place after the choice of policy regime. Agents can
therefore insure themselves against the risk implied by a particular policy regime, but they
can not insure themselves against the choice of regime itself.9
8Sutherland (2006) analyses monetary policy in a model where the population of producers is divided
into exible-price and xed-price producers. The structure in the current paper can be interpreted as a
limiting case where the proportion of exible-price producers in such a framework tends to zero.
9See Senay and Sutherland (2007b) for a detailed discussion of the implications of the timing of asset
trade for optimal monetary policy.
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Asset market equilibrium implies the following relationship between consumption, asset
prices and expected output levels in the two countries
C
C
=
qH
qF
Q =
E
h
y
y+y
i
E
h
y
y+y
iQ (11)
The derivation of this expression is outlined in the Appendix. Notice that the real ex-
change rate, Q, enters this expression. Fluctuations in Q in the LCP case reect ine¢ cient
deviations from the law of one price. These cause deviations from e¢ cient consumption
risk sharing.
2.4 Money Demand and Supply
Optimal choice of money holdings implies
M=P = C (12)
The monetary authorities in each country set monetary policy in terms of the relevant na-
tional money supply. The money supply in the foreign country is assumed to be stochastic
such that logM is symmetrically distributed over the interval [ ; ] with E[logM] = 0
and V ar[logM] = 2. These shocks may represent monetary policy errors on the part
of the foreign monetary authority, or they may be interpreted as disturbances to foreign
money demand, or as nancial innovation shocks, which are not fully accommodated by
money supply changes. The presence of such shocks clearly implies that the foreign central
bank is not following an optimal monetary policy. Thus, the rst-best policy, in terms of
world aggregate welfare, would be a policy rule for the foreign central bank which entirely
eliminates the monetary disturbances. However, the objective of the present paper is to
analyse the home country monetary policy response when the global rst-best policy rule is
not being implemented by the foreign central bank. Thus, for the purposes of this exercise,
the policy of the foreign central bank is taken to be a xed and exogenous feature of the
world economy.
We dene home monetary policy in terms of a feedback rule of the following form
M = M
 
M= M

(13)
The value of the policy feedback parameter, ; di¤ers depending on the monetary regime
under consideration. Four di¤erent regimes are considered: a xed nominal exchange rate;
money targeting; price targeting; and a welfare maximising monetary rule. In the xed
exchange rate regime,  is chosen so that the exchange rate is maintained at a target level, S.
In the money targeting regime,  is set to zero so that the home money supply is constant
9
at M . In the price targeting regime,  is determined so that the virtual (or notional)
producer-price level, P VH , is maintained at a target level, P
V
H . And nally, optimal policy
is dened to be the choice of  which maximises home aggregate utility. The values of 
implied by each regime are stated below.10
3 Welfare
Aggregate welfare of home agents is measured using the following11

 = E

logC   K
2
(Y 2H + Y
2
H )

(14)
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above. A second-
order approximation of the welfare expression is therefore derived. A summary of all the
equations of the model (in both exact and approximated form) is provided in the Appendix.
The Appendix also explains how a second-order accurate solution is obtained.12
A second-order approximation of the welfare measure is given by
~
 = E
n
C^  K Y 2H
h
Y^H + Y^
2
H
i
 K Y 2H
h
Y^ H + Y^
2
H
io
+O
 
3

(15)
where ~
 is the deviation of the level of welfare from the non-stochastic equilibrium. Hence-
forth, a hat over a variable indicates a log deviation from the non-stochastic steady state
and a bar indicates the value in the non-stochastic steady state. Notice that welfare expres-
sion (15) includes the rst moments of consumption and output and the second moments
of output components. Welfare is increasing in the expected level of consumption and
decreasing in the expected level and variance of the components of output. Second-order
accurate solutions for variances can be obtained from rst-order accurate solutions for the
relationships between endogenous variables and the shock variable. The analysis of volatil-
ity therefore involves working with a log-linearised (i.e. rst-order approximated) version
of the model. But a full second-order expression for welfare requires second-order accurate
10The target values of M; S and PVH have no role other than to provide an anchor for nominal vari-
ables. The equilibrium level of nominal variables is irrelevant for aggregate utility and therefore has no
implications for the analysis presented below.
11The utility of real balances is assumed to be small enough to be neglected.
12The approximation is taken around the non-stochastic equilibrium of the model, which is dened as
the solution which results when M = 1 with 2 = 0. Note that, the only exogenous forcing variable in
the model is the foreign money supply, M, so all log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of
the same order as the shocks, which (by assumption) are of maximum size . When presenting an equation
which is approximated up to order n it is therefore possible to gather all terms of order higher than n in
a single term denoted O
 
n+1

.
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solutions for both the rst and second moments of variables. So, a full analysis of welfare
involves working with a second-order approximation of the model.
In the non-stochastic equilibrium, YH and Y H depend on the monopoly mark-up, =( 
1). A common practice in the related literature is to introduce a production subsidy to
ensure that outputs are at their welfare maximising level. In all the cases which we will
examine below it can be shown that E[Y^H ] + E[Y^ 2H ] = E[Y^

H ] + E[Y^
2
H ] = 0: The welfare
results in this paper are thus independent of the value of YH and Y H and are therefore
independent of the monopoly distortion and any production subsidy. This also implies
that welfare is e¤ectively determined by E[C^] alone, i.e. ~
 = E[C^]. This has the useful
implication that welfare, as measured by ~
; can be interpreted directly in terms of log-
changes of consumption relative to its steady state level. Thus, in quantitative terms, 100
~
 can be interpreted as directly equivalent to a percentage of steady state consumption.
3.1 Welfare and Output Volatility
Before analysing the individual monetary policy rules it is useful to trace and explain the
main linkages between monetary policy and welfare. This will provide a framework to
understand and explain the results presented in the next section. The Appendix shows
that welfare, as dened in equation (15), can be re-written in a particularly simple and
intuitive form. In Cases 1 and 4, where foreign producers are following PCP and the home
producers are following either PCP (Case 1) or LCP (Case 4), welfare can be expressed as
follows
~
 =
1
8
E

 (5   1)

Y^ 2H  
(   1)

Y^ 2H
 (3 + 1)

Y^ 2F +
(   1)

Y^ 2F + (   1)S^2

+O
 
3

(16)
while in Cases 2 and 3, where the foreign producers are following LCP and the home
producers are following either LCP (Case 2) or PCP (Case 3), welfare can be expressed in
the form
~
 =
1
8
E

 (5   1)

Y^ 2H  
(   1)

Y^ 2H  
(3 + 1)

Y^ 2F +
(   1)

Y^ 2F

+O
 
3

(17)
Thus welfare can be written as a linear function of the variances of the components of
output in each country, and in the case of equation (16) the variance of the exchange rate.
So, monetary policy a¤ects welfare via its e¤ect on these individual variances.
The impact of monetary policy on the variances of Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H , Y^

F and S^ will be
described in more detail below, but rst it is useful to understand why these variances
a¤ect welfare in the way shown in (16) and (17). As mentioned above, because E[Y^H ] +
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E[Y^ 2H ] = E[Y^

H ] +E[Y^
2
H ] = 0; welfare depends directly (and only) on the expected level of
consumption, E[C^], so to explain (16) and (17) it is necessary rst to understand how the
variances of Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H , Y^

F and S^ a¤ect E[C^]:
The link between output variances and expected consumption operates via the impact
of output variances on the optimal goods prices set by rms. This is shown most clearly
in the rst order conditions for price setting, equations (6) and (7). These equations
show that an important determinant of the optimal price of a good is the variance of
the output of that good. This reects risk aversion on the part of producers. A higher
output variance implies a higher optimal price. And, by denition, a higher optimal price
implies a lower expected level of demand and thus a lower expected level of output of that
good in equilibrium. There is thus a direct negative relationship between the variances of
the output of each good and the expected level of output of that good, i.e. E[Y^ 2H ] has a
negative e¤ect on E[Y^H ]; E[Y^ 2H ] has a negative e¤ect on E[Y^

H ] and so on for the variances
and expected levels of Y^F and Y^ F :
Having explained the link between output variances and expected output levels, it is
now necessary to understand the link between expected output levels and the expected
level of home consumption E[C^] (which is equivalent to home aggregate welfare). The
links between E[Y^H ]; E[Y^ H ], E[Y^F ] and E[Y^

F ] and expected consumption, E[C^]; depend
on three o¤setting e¤ects which vary in strength across the di¤erent types of good.
The rst e¤ect is an aggregate resource e¤ect. An increase in the output of any type of
good increases the aggregate resources available for consumption in the world. The second
e¤ect is a terms of trade e¤ect. An increase in the output of goods produced in the home
country (for either home or foreign consumption) depresses the home terms of trade. The
strength of this e¤ect depends on ; the international trade elasticity. If  is greater than
unity, an increase in the output of home goods has a relatively small impact on the terms of
trade, so the relative income of the home country increases. This allows the home country
to expand consumption at the expense of the foreign country. The third e¤ect is a real
exchange rate e¤ect. An increase in the output of goods consumed by the home country
reduces the relative price of the home consumption basket and thus again allows the home
country to increase consumption at the expense of the foreign country.13
In the case of goods produced in the home country and consumed in the home country,
all three of these e¤ects work in the same direction (at least when  > 1). So a reduction in
the variance of Y^H raises E[Y^H ] and raises E[C^]; hence the negative coe¢ cient on E[Y^ 2H ] in
(16) and (17). In the case of goods produced in home country and consumed in the foreign
13Note that price discrimination between home and foreign markets implies that purchasing power parity
does not hold, even when producers follow PCP. This implies that the real exchange rate e¤ect is present
in all permutations of LCP and PCP.
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country, the terms of trade and real exchange rate e¤ects work in opposite directions (when
 > 1). The terms of trade e¤ect, however, appears to dominate, so that a rise in E[Y^ H ]
increases home income and raises E[C^]: Hence the negative coe¢ cient on E[Y^ 2H ] in (16)
and (17) when  > 1: In the case of foreign produced goods, the terms of trade and real
exchange rate e¤ects again work in opposite directions (when  > 1). For foreign produced
goods for home consumption, the net e¤ect implies a negative coe¢ cient on E[Y^ 2F ] in (16)
and (17), i.e. a rise in E[Y^F ] increases E[C^]: While for foreign produced goods for foreign
consumption, the net e¤ect is a positive coe¢ cient on E[Y^ 2F ] in (16) and (17), i.e. a
reduction in E[Y^ F ] increases E[C^]: This last e¤ect arises because a reduction in E[Y^

F ]
raises the cost of the foreign consumption basket and therefore allows home consumption
to increase relative to foreign consumption.14
This completes the explanation of the link between output variances and welfare. Equa-
tion (16), however, shows that, when foreign producers follow PCP, the variance of the
exchange rate also enters the welfare expression. This e¤ect arises from a combination of
a number of small and o¤setting e¤ects which have no clear economic interpretation. This
e¤ect is positive when  > 1. Thus exchange rate volatility appears to have a positive e¤ect
on welfare for  > 1. But note that exchange rate volatility has an additional indirect e¤ect
on welfare via its impact on the variances of Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H and Y^

F : It is these indirect e¤ects
that dominate the relative performance of the di¤erent policy regimes analysed below.
3.2 Monetary Policy and Output Volatility
The previous sub-section explained welfare in terms of the volatility of Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H , Y^

F
and S^: This explains one part of the link between monetary policy and welfare. It is now
necessary to explain the second part of the link, i.e. the link between home monetary policy
and the volatility of Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H , Y^

F and S^:When considering the impact of monetary policy
on volatility it is su¢ cient to look at rst-order accurate solutions to the model.15
A rst-order expansion of equation (11) shows that risk sharing implies the following
relationship between realised consumption levels in the two countries: C^   C^ = S^ + P^  
P^ + O (2). When combined with the expressions for home and foreign money demand
(which imply M^ = P^ + C^ and M^ = P^  + C^), the following expression for the exchange
14Clearly, the sign of the terms of trade e¤ect depends on the value of : When  < 1 an increase in the
volume of output can lead to a fall in the value of home income. This reverses the sign of the coe¢ cients
on E[Y^ 2H ] and E[Y^
2
F ] in the welfare expressions.
15Terms of order two and higher in expressions for realised values become terms of order three and higher
in expressions for variances. Higher order terms in expressions for realised values are therefore irrelevant
for the second-order accurate analysis of welfare.
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rate is obtained
S^ = M^   M^ +O  2 (18)
Thus the nominal exchange rate depends on relative monetary policy, i.e. the di¤erence
between the home money supply and the foreign money supply. This is one part of the
link between monetary policy and the volatility of Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H and Y^

F :
Using (5) and the corresponding expressions for the foreign country, rst-order approx-
imations for home and foreign aggregate output levels can be written as follows
Y^H = C^   (P^H   P^ ) +O
 
2

; Y^ H = C^
   (P^ H   P^ ) +O
 
2

(19)
Y^F = C^   (P^F   P^ ) +O
 
2

; Y^ F = C^
   (P^ F   P^ ) +O
 
2

(20)
These equations show that output levels depend on aggregate consumption in the relevant
country and a relative price term. Making use of rst-order approximations of P^ and P^ 
(i.e. (4) and its foreign counterpart) and the expressions for money demand (i.e. (12) and
its foreign counterpart) it is possible to rewrite (19) and (20) as follows
Y^H = M^   + 1
2
P^H +
   1
2
P^F +O
 
2

; Y^ H = M^
   + 1
2
P^ H +
   1
2
P^ F +O
 
2

(21)
Y^F = M^+
   1
2
P^H   + 1
2
P^F +O
 
2

; Y^ F = M^
+
   1
2
P^ H 
 + 1
2
P^ F +O
 
2

(22)
Furthermore, it follows from the rst-order conditions for price setting that P^H = 0 and
P^ F = 0: So
Y^H = M^ +
   1
2
P^F +O
 
2

; Y^ H = M^
    + 1
2
P^ H +O
 
2

(23)
Y^F = M^    + 1
2
P^F +O
 
2

; Y^ F = M^
 +
   1
2
P^ H +O
 
2

(24)
Expressions (23) and (24) show that output levels depend on the money supply and
P^F (the price of foreign goods in the home market) and P^ H (the price of home goods in
the foreign market). The rst-order behaviour of P^ H and P^F in turn depend on whether
producers are following PCP or LCP pricing. If home producers are following PCP then
P^ H =  S^, while in the LCP case P^ H = 0: Likewise if foreign producers are following
PCP then P^F = S^, while the LCP case implies P^F = 0: The links between monetary
policy and output therefore depend on the conguration of PCP and LCP across the two
countries. The expressions for output levels are summarised in Table 1. The table shows the
expressions for output levels (after substituting for the exchange rate using S^ = M^   M^)
for the four permutations of PCP and LCP across the two countries.
The expressions in Table 1 show that monetary policy has potentially two e¤ects on
output levels, one via the impact of home money on the world aggregate money supply,
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Table 1: Output Expressions in Cases 1-4
Case 1 (Home PCP, Foreign PCP)
Y^H =
1
2
(M^ + M^) + 
2
(M^   M^)
Y^F =
1
2
(M^ + M^)  
2
(M^   M^)
Y^ H =
1
2
(M^ + M^) + 
2
(M^   M^)
Y^ F =
1
2
(M^ + M^)  
2
(M^   M^)
Case 2 (Home LCP, Foreign LCP)
Y^H = M^
Y^F = M^
Y^ H = M^

Y^ F = M^

Case 3 (Home PCP, Foreign LCP)
Y^H = M^
Y^F = M^
Y^ H =
1
2
(M^ + M^) + 
2
(M^   M^)
Y^ F =
1
2
(M^ + M^)  
2
(M^   M^)
Case 4 (Home LCP, Foreign PCP)
Y^H =
1
2
(M^ + M^) + 
2
(M^   M^)
Y^F =
1
2
(M^ + M^)  
2
(M^   M^)
Y^ H = M^

Y^ F = M^

(M^ + M^), and one via the impact of home money on relative money supplies, (M^   M^).
The rst e¤ect arises because, for given price levels, monetary policy a¤ects home and
foreign aggregate consumption, C and C, directly via money market equilibrium. The
second e¤ect arises because monetary policy a¤ects relative goods prices via the nominal
exchange rate, S (as shown in (18)). But the magnitude of this second e¤ect depends on
the degree of exchange rate pass-through, and thus di¤ers in the PCP and LCP cases.
The relative price e¤ect also depends on the international trade elasticity, . The relative
importance of (M^ + M^) and (M^   M^) in Y^H , Y^F , Y^ H and Y^ F thus depends jointly on
the value of  and the form of price setting. The larger the value of  (i.e. the stronger
the expenditure switching e¤ect) the more important is volatility in S and thus the more
important is (M^ M^): But this e¤ect only arises in the PCP case. In the LCP case, there
is no pass-through from exchange rate changes to prices.
Given exogenous shocks to M, a policy which stabilises (M^ + M^) will necessarily
destabilise (M^   M^) and vice versa. The home monetary authority therefore faces a
trade-o¤ between stabilising (M^ + M^) and (M^   M^): The terms of this trade-o¤ will
depend on the form of price setting, PCP versus LCP, and on the value of : The balance
between these di¤erent e¤ects clearly has important implications for the relative welfare
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Table 2: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 1
Fixed rate Money targeting Price targeting Optimal policy
 1 0  1
+3
2+ 2
(+3)
~
  2  1
8

2    + 42     +1
+3

2  

2+4 1
2(+3)

2
E
h
S^2
i
0 2
 
4
+3
2
2

2(+1)
(+3)
2
2
performance of the di¤erent policy regimes. This will become clear as the results are
described for the four di¤erent permutations of LCP and PCP in Cases 1 to 4.
4 Results
The results are now presented for the four cases outlined in the introduction. In Case 1
both home and foreign producers follow PCP.16 In Case 2 both home and foreign producers
follow LCP. Cases 3 and 4 are asymmetric. In Case 3 home producers follow PCP and
foreign producers follow LCP. And in Case 4 home producers follow LCP and foreign
producers follow PCP.
4.1 Case 1: Home and Foreign Producers Follow PCP
Table 2 presents a comparison between the four monetary policy regimes when both home
and foreign producers follow PCP. These results are also illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and
3 where  (the policy feedback parameter), ~
 (welfare) and the standard deviation of S^
are plotted for the four policy regimes for a range of values of .17 The results shown in
Table 2 and Figures 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the results presented in our previous analysis
(Senay and Sutherland, 2007a).18
First consider a comparison between money targeting and a xed nominal exchange
16A detailed analysis of Case 1 is presented in Senay and Sutherland (2007a).
17For the purpose of illustration these gures, and all subsequent gures, are based on  = 0:1: The
vertical axis in Figure 2 plots welfare in terms of 100 ~
: This quantity can be interpreted as a percentage
of steady state consumption. Subsequent welfare plots can also be interpreted in these terms.
18There are minor di¤erences compared to Senay and Sutherland (2007a) because our previous analysis
was based on a model where utility was not additively separable in Y^H and Y^ H : These small di¤erences
do not change the qualitative nature of the results.
16
Figure 1:  in Case 1
Figure 2: Welfare in Case 1
Figure 3: Exchange rate variability in Case 1
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rate. In terms of the policy rule (13), monetary targeting clearly implies  = 0, while equa-
tion (18) shows that a xed nominal exchange rate requires  = 1: The welfare comparison
in Table 2 and Figure 2 shows that, for low values of  money targeting delivers higher
welfare than a xed rate, while the opposite is the case for higher values of : This can be
easily understood by considering the welfare function in (16) and the expressions for the
components of output given in Table 1. The main determinants of welfare are the variances
of Y^H and Y^ H : The expressions in Table 1 show that in Case 1 the variances of both Y^H
and Y^ H are heavily inuenced by the trade-o¤ between aggregate money, (M^ + M^
); and
relative money, (M^   M^):
Relative monetary policy, (M^ M^); clearly becomes more important as  increases, i.e.
as the international trade elasticity rises. Money targeting is good for stabilising (M^+M^),
while a xed rate is good for stabilising (M^   M^): Thus money targeting is the better
policy when (M^   M^) is relatively less important for output determination, i.e. when 
is low, while a xed rate is better when (M^   M^) is relatively more important, i.e. when
 is high.
Now consider the welfare performance of price targeting (dened in terms of targeting
P VH ). For  > 1, Table 2 shows that price targeting implies a value of  between zero and
unity. Thus price targeting can be regarded as a compromise between monetary targeting
and a xed rate. Figure 2 shows that price targeting delivers higher welfare than both a
xed rate and money targeting for all values of . This higher welfare performance arises
because price targeting o¤ers a compromise between stabilising (M^ + M^) and stabilising
(M^   M^). Price targeting is thus more successful at stabilising home output than either
a xed rate or money targeting. Notice that, as  rises, so that exchange rate volatility
becomes more important in determining output volatility, price targeting tends to imply
more exchange rate stabilisation.
While price targeting is a good compromise between a xed rate and money targeting,
Table 2 shows that price targeting is not equivalent to the fully optimal policy. The fully
optimal policy rule is given by choosing the value of  to maximise home welfare. The
implied optimal value of  is shown in Table 2. For  > 1 it is clear that this value of  is
again between zero and unity, so optimal policy is a compromise between a xed rate and
money targeting. Figure 3 shows that price targeting is a reasonably good approximation
for optimal policy, but optimal policy (for  > 1) implies slightly more exchange rate
stabilisation than price targeting.19
19Notice that when  < 1 optimal policy implies higher exchange rate volatility than the other regimes.
As previously explained, when  < 1; an increase in home output reduces home income. This reverses
the welfare impact of exchange rate volatility. When  < 1; higher exchange rate volatility reduces home
output and increases home income.
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A useful point of comparison in the existing literature is the analysis of Benigno and
Benigno (2003) who show that price targeting is the optimal coordinated and Nash equi-
librium policy in a two-country model with PCP and shocks to productivity. Benigno and
Benigno (2003) assume a unit elasticity between home and foreign goods ( = 1), but
the optimality of price targeting in a coordinated equilibrium continues to hold in their
framework for  di¤erent from unity. This contrasts with our nding that price targeting
is not fully optimal in the face of foreign monetary shocks when  di¤ers from unity.
4.2 Case 2: Home and Foreign Producers Follow LCP
Now consider Case 2, where both home and foreign producers follow LCP. Table 3 presents
a comparison between the four monetary regimes for Case 2.
It is immediately clear that monetary targeting, price targeting and optimal policy are
all identical in this case. They all imply  = 0 and they all deliver higher welfare than
a xed nominal exchange rate. The explanation for this ranking of regimes is simple to
understand in terms of the output equations in Table 1 and the welfare expression (17).
These equations show that Y^H and Y^F depend only on M^ and that Y^ H and Y^

F depend
only on M^. Home monetary policy has no impact on Y^ H and Y^

F so there is no scope for
monetary policy to stabilise these components of output. The only role for home monetary
policy is thus to stabilise Y^H and Y^F and this can be achieved by a completely passive
monetary regime, i.e. monetary targeting. This policy also completely stabilises P^ + C^
and thus (given stabilisation of Y^H) delivers perfect stabilisation of P^ VH ; as required by
price targeting.
A xed rate regime, however, is clearly sub-optimal because it requires home monetary
policy to match the foreign money shocks. This causes unnecessary, and welfare reducing,
volatility in Y^H and Y^F .
The underlying reason for the contrast with Case 1 is the complete absence of the ex-
penditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate changes when both home and foreign producers
follow LCP. Symmetric LCP implies that exchange rate changes have no impact on the
relative prices faced by consumers in the short run. Nominal exchange rate volatility is
therefore irrelevant for output determination and welfare. The incentive to stabilise the
exchange rate is correspondingly reduced. An obvious corollary of this is that the interna-
tional trade elasticity, ; is irrelevant to the welfare comparison between policy regimes.
Notice that the presence of LCP in this model has an e¤ect which is exactly opposite
to that in the Devereux and Engel (2003) analysis, where LCP creates an incentive for ex-
change rate stabilisation. In the Devereux and Engel (2003) model the impact of exchange
rate volatility on consumption risk sharing is strong enough on its own to make a xed rate
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Table 3: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 2
Fixed rate Money targeting Price targeting Optimal policy
 1 0 0 0
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Table 4: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 3
Fixed rate Money targeting Price targeting Optimal policy
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optimal. This e¤ect does not arise in the model analysed here because a xed exchange
rate transfers consumption risk from the foreign country to the home country. This may
be welfare improving for the foreign country and even may be welfare improving for the
world as a whole (measured in terms of the aggregate of home and foreign utility) but it
is not welfare improving for the home country.
4.3 Case 3: Home Producers Follow PCP, Foreign Producers
Follow LCP
Table 4 and Figures 4, 5 and 6 present a comparison between the four monetary policy
regimes in Case 3, where home producers follow PCP and foreign producers follow LCP.
This corresponds to a world where the home currency is an international reference currency,
while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. So the home country can
be thought of as the USA, for instance, while monetary shocks may be thought of as
occurring outside the USA.
Table 4 shows that, again, money targeting, price targeting and optimal policy are all
20
Figure 4:  in Case 3
Figure 5: Welfare in Case 3
Figure 6: Exchange rate variability in Case 3
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identical. In all these cases the value of  is zero. As in Case 2, these regimes yield higher
welfare than a xed exchange rate.
This ranking of policy regimes is again easily explained with reference to the output
expressions given in Table 1 and the welfare expression (17). In Case 3 these expressions
show that Y^H and Y^F depend only on M^: Y^H and Y^F are the outputs of goods which
the home country consumes so, as discussed in Section 3.1, the variances of Y^H and Y^F
are particularly signicant in the determination of home welfare. Clearly, therefore, the
stabilisation of Y^H and Y^F has strong welfare benets. This has a close parallel to the
results just discussed for Case 2. However, unlike Case 2, Y^ H and Y^

F are not independent
of home monetary policy. Nevertheless, the variances of Y^ H and Y^

F have equal and opposite
e¤ects on home welfare (as shown in equation (17)) so stabilisation of these outputs has no
net welfare benet to the home economy. It is therefore optimal for the home country to
adopt money targeting. As in Case 2, money targeting and price targeting are equivalent
because P^ VH = Y^H + P^ + C^ = 2M^:
The underlying explanation for these results is the following. When foreign producers
follow LCP, home country consumers face prices which are xed in the home currency and
are therefore insulated from changes in the nominal exchange rate. There is therefore no
expenditure switching e¤ect for home consumption goods. Exchange rate volatility is thus
unimportant for home consumption goods. There is, however, an expenditure switching
e¤ect for foreign consumption goods, but volatility in the output of foreign consumption
goods has no net impact on home welfare, so exchange rate volatility is irrelevant for the
home economy.20
4.4 Case 4: Home Producers Follow LCP, Foreign Producers
Follow PCP
Case 2 and Case 3 both show a complete contrast to the results emphasised in Case 1. In
both Case 2 and Case 3 a xed exchange rate is the lowest ranked regime in terms of welfare.
In both cases the expenditure switching e¤ect, and thus exchange rate volatility, is largely
(or completely) irrelevant for home country monetary policy. A policy of money targeting,
or equivalently price targeting, is optimal, regardless of the value of the international trade
20There is a clear parallel between this result and a result obtained by Devereux et al (2007). Devereux
et al analyse a model of a reference currency and nd that the country with the reference currency is
indi¤erent to exchange rate volatility while the non-reference country places a high welfare weight on
exchange rate volatility. As with most of the LCP literature, Devereux et al focus on the implications
of productivity shocks. Furthermore, unlike this paper, they do not compare monetary policy regimes.
Instead they focus on a Nash equilibrium in the choice of monetary rules.
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Table 5: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 4
Fixed rate Money targeting Price targeting Optimal policy
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Figure 7:  in Case 4
elasticity, : Clearly, the crucial feature of both cases is that foreign producers are following
LCP. This is su¢ cient to insulate the home country from the exchange rate volatility caused
by foreign money shocks and its welfare reducing e¤ects.
Now consider Case 4, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow
PCP. In this case it is the foreign currency which can be regarded as the reference currency
(such as the US dollar) while the home currency is a non-reference currency. The results
for this case are given in Table 5 and illustrated in Figures 7, 8 and 9. These results
show, in contrast to Cases 2 and 3, that exchange rate volatility is now very important for
home welfare and home monetary policy. The assumption of PCP in the foreign country
is clearly su¢ cient to expose the home country to the e¤ects of foreign money shocks.
To understand these points in more detail rst consider a comparison between money
targeting and a xed nominal exchange rate. As before, money targeting implies  = 0 and
a xed rate requires  = 1: Table 5 and Figure 8 show that, as in Case 1, money targeting
yields higher welfare when  is relatively low, while a xed rate yields higher welfare for
larger values of : The output equations in Table 1 and the welfare expression (16) show
that the underlying explanation for this results is the same as that given in Case 1. The
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Figure 8: Welfare in Case 4
Figure 9: Exchange rate variability in Case 4
home monetary authority, in attempting to stabilise Y^H and Y^F ; faces a trade-o¤ between
stabilising (M^+M^) and (M^ M^):Money targeting yields a lower volatility of (M^+M^)
at the expense of higher volatility of (M^   M^): This yields lower volatility of Y^H and
Y^F (compared to a xed exchange rate) when  is relatively low. A xed exchange rate
completely stabilises (M^ M^) at the expense of higher volatility of (M^+M^): This yields
lower volatility of Y^H and Y^F (compared to money targeting) when  is relatively high.
As in Case 1, price targeting o¤ers a compromise between the xed rate and money
targeting regimes (when  > 1) in the sense that  lies between zero and unity. Price
targeting therefore implies more exchange rate volatility than a xed rate, but less exchange
rate volatility than money targeting (for  > 1): Notice, however, that, unlike in Case 1,
price targeting is not welfare superior to a xed rate for all values of : In fact, for values of
 greater than approximately 3.8 a xed rate yields higher welfare than price targeting.21
This is an important di¤erence between Case 4 and Case 1 (where price targeting is always
welfare superior to a xed rate).
To understand this contrast between the performance of price targeting in Case 1 and
21Notice again that when  < 1 optimal policy implies higher exchange rate volatility than the other
regimes. As previously explained, when  < 1 the welfare impact of exchange rate volatility is reversed.
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Case 4 it is necessary to consider the impact of monetary policy on the volatility of Y^ H and
Y^ F and the impact of these volatilities on home welfare. Y^

H and Y^

F are exogenous in Case
4 and thus have no implications for the comparison between policy regimes in that case.
But in Case 1 home monetary policy can a¤ect Y^ H and Y^

F ; so the di¤erence between the
performance of price targeting in Cases 1 and 4 must be related to these variables.
Notice from the welfare expression (16) that the variances of Y^ H and Y^

F have equal
and opposite e¤ects on home welfare. The variance of Y^ H has a negative welfare impact,
while the variance of Y^ F has a positive welfare impact. Home welfare is thus decreasing in
E[Y^ 2H ] E[Y^ 2F ]: This di¤erence in Case 4 is clearly zero. But the expressions for Y^ H and Y^ F
in Table 1 for Case 1 show that E[Y^ 2H ] E[Y^ 2F ] = E[(M^+M^)(M^ M^)] = E[M^2 M^2]:
In Case 1, therefore, this term contributes an extra negative impact of monetary activism
which does not arise in Case 4. In other words, the optimal  in Case 4 is greater than the
optimal  in Case 1 (when  > 1): Optimal policy in Case 4 therefore yields lower exchange
rate volatility than in Case 1. Thus, in Case 4, for large values of  a xed exchange rate
is closer to optimal policy than price targeting.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyses the implications of LCP in a two-country model where monetary
shocks arise in the foreign country and the policy question is the choice of appropriate
monetary regime for the home country. In the presence of foreign monetary shocks, the
expenditure switching role of the exchange rate can have a potentially welfare reducing
e¤ect because it transmits the e¤ects of foreign shocks to the home economy. LCP has
obvious implications for the expenditure switching role of the exchange rate and this paper
shows how LCP a¤ects the welfare comparison between policy regimes in the face of foreign
monetary shocks.
The paper considers four possible combinations of PCP and LCP. In the case where
there is complete and symmetric LCP we nd that the expenditure switching e¤ect is absent
and exchange rate movements play no part in transmitting foreign monetary shocks to the
home country. This completely removes any incentive for the home country to stabilise
the exchange rate. In this case, oating rate regimes are shown to be welfare superior to a
xed exchange rate. The conclusions are di¤erent, however, if LCP is asymmetric. In the
case where home country producers adopt PCP while foreign producers adopt LCP, we nd
that the case for exchange rate exibility is strengthened relative to the symmetric PCP
case. But in the opposite case, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers
follow PCP, the case for exchange rate stabilisation is strengthened. In fact, in this second
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asymmetric case, a xed rate can out-perform price targeting in welfare terms.
The second asymmetric case corresponds to a world where the foreign currency is an
international reference currency (e.g. the US dollar). So the policy problem can be inter-
preted as the regime choice faced by countries (other than the USA) in a world where trade
is priced in US dollars and where US monetary shocks cause uctuations in the value of
the dollar. The conclusion is that such countries can benet by stabilising (or even xing)
the value of their currency against the dollar. This indeed corresponds to the monetary
policy actually adopted by a wide range of emerging market countries.
The rst asymmetric case corresponds to a world where the home currency is a reference
currency, while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. The conclusion,
in this case, is that exchange rate exibility is a useful way for the home country to insulate
itself from foreign monetary shocks.
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Appendix
A: Portfolio Allocation, Asset Prices and Risk Sharing
There are four rst-order conditions for the choice of asset holdings. After some rearrange-
ment they imply the following four equations
E

C 1y

= E

C 1

qH ; E

C 1y

= E

C 1

qF (A1)
E

C 1y

= E

C 1

qH ; E

C 1y

= E

C 1

qF (A2)
Using the solution procedure outlined in Obstfeld and Rogo¤(1996, pp. 302-3) it is possible
to show that consumption levels in the two countries are given by
C =
qH [y + y
]
qH + qF
Q; C =
qF [y + y
]
qH + qF
and the two asset prices are given by
qH =
E
h
y
y+y
i
E
h
1
y+y
i ; qF = E
h
y
y+y
i
E
h
1
y+y
i (A3)
which implies
C
C
=
qH
qF
Q =
E
h
y
y+y
i
E
h
y
y+y
iQ (A4)
which is equation (11) in the main text.
B: Model solution
The equations of the model are summarised in Table 6. The equations in their exact
form are shown in the rst column and the second-order approximations are shown in
the second column. The second-order terms from the approximate form of the equations
are summarised in Table 7. Note that the rst-order approximation of the model can be
obtained from the equations in the second column of Table 6 by setting all the second-order
terms equal to zero. Note also that, to a rst-order approximation, all expected values are
zero. The set of equations varies depending on the conguration of LCP and PCP in
the two countries. In Case 1, where both home and foreign producers follow PCP, the
relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B16) with second-order terms given by (B19) to (B26)
in Table 7. In Case 2, where both home and foreign producers follow LCP, the relevant set
of equations is (B1) to (B14) and (B17) and (B18) with second order terms (B19) to (B24)
and (B27) and (B28). In Case 3, where home producers follow PCP and foreign producers
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Table A1: Equations of the model
Exact Equation 2nd Order Approximation
P =

1
2
P 1 H +
1
2
P 1 F
 1
1  P^ = 1
2
P^H +
1
2
P^F + P (B1)
P  =

1
2
P 1 H +
1
2
P 1 F
 1
1  P^  = 1
2
P^ H +
1
2
P^ F + P  (B2)
YH =
1
2
C
 
PH
P
 
Y^H = C^   

P^H   P^

(B3)
YF =
1
2
C
 
PF
P
 
Y^F = C^   

P^F   P^

(B4)
Y H =
1
2
C

P H
P 
 
Y^ H = C^
   

P^ H   P^ 

(B5)
Y F =
1
2
C

P F
P 
 
Y^ F = C^
   

P^ F   P^ 

(B6)
y = (YHPH=S + Y

HP

H)=P
 y^ = 1
2
(Y^H + P^H   S^) + 12(Y^ H + P^ H)  P^  + y (B7)
y = (YFPF=S + Y FP

F=)=P
 y^ = 1
2
(Y^F + P^F   S^) + 12(Y^ F + P^ F )  P^  + y (B8)
C
C =
E[ yy+y ]
E[ y

y+y ]
SP 
P
C^   C^ = E [y^]  E[y^] + S^ + P^    P^ (B9)
M=P = C M^   P^ = C^ (B10)
M=P  = C M^   P^  = C^ (B11)
M = M
 
M= M

M^ = M^ (B12)
PH =

 1
KE[Y 2H]
E[YH=(PC)]
P^H = E[Y^H + P^ + C^] + PH + PH (B13)
P F =

 1
KE[Y 2F ]
E[Y F =(P C)]
P^ F = E[Y^

F + P^
 + C^] + P F + P F (B14)
P H =

 1
KE[Y 2H ]
E[Y H=(PC)]S
P^ H = E[Y^

H + P^ + C^]  S^ + P H + P H (B15)
PF =

 1
KE[Y 2F ]S
E[YF =(P C)]
P^F = E[Y^F + P^
 + C^] + S^ + PF + PF (B16)
P H =

 1
KE[Y 2H ]
E[SY H=(PC)]
P^ H = E[Y^

H + P^ + C^   S^] + P H + P H (B17)
PF =

 1
KE[Y 2F ]
E[YF =(SP C)]
P^F = E[Y^F + P^
 + C^ + S^] + PF + PF (B18)
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Table A2: Second-order terms
P =
1
8
(1  )(P^H   P^F )2 (B19)
P  =
1
8
(1  )(P^ H   P^ F )2 (B20)
y =
1
2
(Y^H + P^H   S^   Y^ H   P^ H)2 (B21)
y =
1
2
(Y^F + P^F   S^   Y^ F   P^ F )2 (B22)
PH = 2E[Y^
2
H ]; PH =  12E[(Y^H   P^   C^)2] (B23)
P F = 2E[Y^
2
F ]; P F =  12E[(Y^ F   P^    C^)2] (B24)
P H = 2E[Y^
2
H ]; P H =  12E[(Y^ H   P^   C^)2] (B25)
PF = 2E[Y^
2
F ]; PF =  12E[(Y^F   P^    C^)2] (B26)
P H = 2E[Y^
2
H ]; P H =  12E[(Y^ H + S^   P^   C^)2] (B27)
PF = 2E[Y^
2
F ]; PF =  12E[(Y^F   S^   P^    C^)2] (B28)
follow LCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B15) and (B18) with second order
terms (B19) to (B25) and (B28). And in Case 4, where home producers follow LCP and
foreign producers follow PCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B14) and (B16) and
(B17) with second order terms (B19) to (B24) and (B26) and (B27). In each of the four
cases the set of equations solves for the equilibrium values of vector V where
V =
h
P^ P^  Y^H Y^F Y^ H Y^

F y^ y^
 S^ C^ C^ M^ P^H P^F P^ H P^

F
i
To solve for welfare it is necessary to obtain a second-order accurate expression for
E[C^]. It is useful to do this in two stages. In the rst stage it is possible to solve for E[C^]
in terms of the second-order terms P ; P  etc. to yield the following expression
E[C^] =
1
2
E

1  5
8
PH +
1  
8
P H  
1 + 3
8
PF  
1  
8
P F
+
1  5
8
PH +
1  
8
P H  
1 + 3
8
PF  
1  
8
P F
 (1 + )P + 1 + 
4
y   1 + 
4
y

This expression is identical for all permutations of LCP and PCP across the two countries.
In the second stage it is necessary to substitute for the second-order terms using the
expressions in Table 7. The resulting expression for E[C^] can be further simplied by
evaluating second-order terms using rst-order accurate expressions for realised values. As
previously noted, the rst-order approximation for the model is obtained from the rst-
order parts of the equations listed in column 2 of Table 6. By this means, it is possible to
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show in Cases 1 and 4 that
E
"
1 5
8
PH +
1 
8
P H   1+38 PF   1 8 P F
 (1 + )P + 1+4 y   1+4 y
#
=
1
8
(   1)E[S^2] (B29)
and thus
E[C^] =
1
8
E

 (5   1)

Y^ 2H  
(   1)

Y^ 2H
 (3 + 1)

Y^ 2F +
(   1)

Y^ 2F + (   1)S^2

+O
 
3

(B30)
which is the welfare expression given in (16) in the main text. While in Cases 2 and 3 it
can be shown that
E
"
1 5
8
PH +
1 
8
P H   1+38 PF   1 8 P F
 (1 + )P + 1+4 y   1+4 y
#
= 0 (B31)
and thus
E[C^] =
1
8
E

 (5   1)

Y^ 2H  
(   1)

Y^ 2H
 (3 + 1)

Y^ 2F +
(   1)

Y^ 2F

+O
 
3

(B32)
which is the welfare expression given in (17) in the main text.
A similar two-stage solution procedure can be used to show that E[Y^H ] + E[Y^ 2H ] =
E[Y^ H ] + E[Y^
2
H ] = 0: This conrms that ~
 = E[C^]:
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